Author: Mateo González-Vázquez
Arraona Romana collaboration.
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| The punic district overlooking modern Tunis, commonly known as ‘Hannibal’s district’ (photo taken by the author, August 2013) |
Yann Le Bohec concludes in his paper on the Third
Punic War (149-146 BC) that the ‘responsibility of Rome is full and total in
triggering this conflict.’(1) This is just one instance of what is generally stated regarding Carthage’s
destruction in 146 BC: it was a Roman war and a Roman decision. However, is
this picture accurate? The Third Punic War is an episode plenty of
exceptionalities, the sources for which turn out to be rather problematic. The purpose of these lines is not to
rule out Rome’s role in the Third Punic War, but instead to bring forward other
local factors that certainly would have had an impact on the decision-making
process, which eventually led to the outbreak of this conflict. In the
following lines I shall introduce you to Gulussa, referred by Appian as
‘arbiter of peace and war’ and ‘man of warlike parts’, and how he had a strong
impact on Carthage’s fate in 146 BC.
In 148, Masinissa died at the age of 90: ‘He
[Masinissa] left a great sum of money in his treasury and a large and
well-disciplined army. Of his enemies he took Syphax prisoner with his own
land, and was a cause of the destruction of Carthage, having left it a prey to
the Romans, completely deprived of strength’ (App. Pun. 105). As a result of
Masinissa’s death and, according to Appian ‘a cause of the destruction of
Carthage’ (Καρχηδόνι δ’αἲτιον τῆς ἀναστάσεως γενέσθαι), Gulussa was appointed chief commander of
Masinissa’s army: ‘In
this way Scipio divided the government and estate of Masinissa among his
children, and he brought Gulussa straightway to the aid of the Romans.’ (App. Pun.
107). Gulussa before Scipio’s appointment was already playing a
preeminent role in Numidian war affairs. According to Livy, Gulussa warned the
Romans about Carthaginian military preparations in ca. 154-150 (Per. 47),
and he prompted a debate among Roman senators: ‘When the envoys returned from
Africa with representatives of the Carthaginians and with Gulussa the son of
Masinissa, they reported that they had discovered both an army and a fleet at
Carthage. The senate decided to poll the opinions of all the senators’ (Per. 47). Gulussa appears in Appian’s
account as a ruthless general, showing no mercy to the defeated Carthaginians. In
a military campaign in 150, when a group of deserters to Masinissa decided to
come to terms and give him what he was demanding, and were allowed to pass out
of the circumvallation. Gulussa decided to chase them with his Numidian cavalry
and almost 58,000 unarmed Carthaginians were slaughtered (App. Pun. 73). Appian
himself describes him as a ‘man of warlike parts’ (στρατιωτικῶ),
and he was appointed by Scipio as ‘arbiter of peace and war’ (App. Pun. 106).
Here Appian utilizes the Greek word κυριος, which I think has a stronger
implication than being a mere ‘arbiter’. Polybius however in 38.7.2 describes
Gulussa as king of the Numidians (Γολόσσῃ...Νομάδων βασιλεῖ), to whom according to Pliny the Elder (HN 7.47) he
dedicated a passage to speak about his authority: ‘…Polybius tradidit auctore
Gulusa regulo’. It is quite revealing that in Livy’s Periochae 49 Gulussa is
oddly presented as a mere assistant of the Roman auxiliaries (Romanorum auxilia
iuvantis). To sum up, Gulussa’s attitude and modus faciendi can be perfectly
associated with the ruthless destruction of Carthage, even though they had
previously surrendered, and his authority was downplayed by the late Roman tradition (i.e.
Livy).
There are some bits of evidence that might suggest
Gulussa’s shared command during the siege of Carthage, probably in exchange of
the military support: ‘Aspiring to the command in the city, which was held by
another Hasdrubal, a nephew of Gulussa, he accused the latter of an intention
to betray Carthage to Gulussa.’ (111). Such accusations were probably prompted
by the two meetings between Hasdrubal and Gulussa before Carthage’s siege (Polyb.
38.7.1-15). As a bit of speculation, we could also argue that Gulussa’s actions
were determined by his newly acquired position, thus seeking a striking success
in order to strengthen his position against (probably) his two peer brothers.
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Mausoleum
of Ateban, a rare example of royal Numidian architecture, 2nd
century BCE (Dougga, Tunisia). Photo taken by the author, August 2013.
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Right before the siege of Carthage in 146 BC the
ancient sources barely mention the role played by the Numidian troops. This
invisibility of Numidian troops is quite telling if we consider that, according
to Appian, the Roman forces were some 80,000 infantry, that is, two consular
armies (Marcius Censorinus’ and Manilius’), plus 4,000 cavalry (Pun. 75). It
has been claimed that this is too high a number for four legions. Brunt
suggests that this number might also include the Numidian or Gallic horse, but
in that case it would be yet too small as a complement to the regular infantry. (2) Even if they outnumbered the Carthaginians, which is not certain given that
just outside the city Hasdrubal was leading a force 30,000 soldiers strong
(App. Pun. 120), and they had the advantage of being in the fortified city. The
number of soldiers can also be roughly inferred from the surrender of 200,000
suits of armor and 2,000 catapults to Utica (App. Pun. 80.375). We can see in
two occasions how the Romans dispatched embassies to Masinissa since they were
alarmed at the lack of success and Masinissa’s neutrality. According to Appian
at the beginning the Romans were hesitant on capturing Carthage (Pun. 94), at
the same time in which they inform Masinissa that they would draw on his troops
whenever needed. Shortly afterwards in 148 Scipio sent another embassy to
Masinissa for military aid: ‘…on account of the many mishaps that had taken
place they sent to Masinissa to secure his aid utmost against Carthage’ (Pun.
105). To sum up, I think it can be clearly implied that Scipio alone was not
able to siege successfully a city like Carthage if a similar number of soldiers
and resources was not provided by Gulussa and the Numidian kingdom.
All things
considered, I think that the death of Masinissa and the appointment of Gulussa
represented a turning point in order to determine the outcome of the conflict
with Carthage, not being in Rome’s mind from the very beginning the destruction
of Carthage. The Numidian kingdom would certainly benefit from the destruction
of his enemy and neighbour. For instance, Livy reports that Masinissa
accumulated large surpluses of cereal-production. (3) Between 200 and 198 he presented the Romans with 400,000 pecks of wheat and
200,000 of barley; in 191, 800,000 pecks of wheat and 550,000 of barley were promised;
and in 170 he guaranteed a million pecks of wheat for the Roman forces in
Macedon.(4)
Epigraphical evidence shows that similar contributions were made to the island
of Delos under the years 168 and 162-1. (5)
Some evidence also reveals that Masinissa was acquainted with a Rhodian and an
Athenian merchant. (6) Strabo also mentions the
existence of a colony of Greeks in Cirta (17.3.13). Finally, Polybius also
casts some light on this issue: ‘In Africa Massanissa, seeing the numbers of
the cities founded on the coast of the Lesser Syrtis and the fertility of the
country which they call Emporia, and casting envious eyes on the abundant
revenue derived from this district, had tried, not many years before the time I
am dealing with, to wrest it from Carthage’ (31.21). Obviously, one might
conclude that Numidia had commercial interests that might be somewhat
interrupted or impeded by rivalries with its Carthaginian neighbor.
(1)Le Bohec, Y. (2011). ‘The
“Third Punic War”: The siege of Carthage (148-146 BC)’, in Hoyos, D.B. (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Oxford, p. 435.
(2)Brunt, P.A. (1971). Italian manpower: 225 B.C. – A.D. 14. Oxford, p. 684.
(3)Walsh, P.G. (1965). ‘Masinissa’, Journal of Roman Studies, vol. 55, p. 154.
(4)Livy,
31.19.4, 32.27.2, 36.4.8, 43.6.13.(
(5)For
references, see Walsh 1965, op. cit.,
p. 155, n. 59.
(6)IG XI, 4, 1115-16.